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At the recent 16th Party Congress a comprehensive change of the Chi-
nese leadership was carried through. Even though there was much
speculation as to whether Jiang Zemin and his generation would retire
as scheduled, the change of the old guard took place without much
drama when the congress finally convened in Beijing.
How do we evaluate this development? Does it mean that Chinese
politics have matured in the sense that major decisions now conform to
fixed rules and regulations rather than factional politics? Has the Chi-
nese political process become more transparent? Have consensual de-
cision-making processeses finally taken over, relegating patrimonial
policies to a phenomenon of the past? Since the mid-1990s, clear and
detailed regulations for the selection and appointment of leading cad-
res have been promulgated. Is the 16th Party Congress the final step in
this process of procedural normativization? Before attempting to an-
swer these questions, this paper will first deal with the personnel
changes that took place at the 16th Party Congress and the Central Com-
mittee (CC) meeting shortly after the conclusion of the conference.1
Composition of the Politburo Standing Committee
On 15 November, the 16th Central Committee elected a new General
Secretary and new members of the Politburo and the Politburo Stand-
ing Committee (PBSC). The new Standing Committee of the Politburo,
the true ruling elite, consists of nine members (see Table 1). Eight of
these have been moved up from the Politburo. Only Hu Jintao, the new
general secretary, had a seat on the outgoing PBSC. Li Changchun is at
58 the youngest of the new PBSC members. Luo Gan has turned 67 and
is the oldest. The average age is 62, compared to an average age of 70
for the outgoing members.
The new general secretary, Hu Jintao, is often described by the West-
ern news media as an enigmatic person whose beliefs and background
are little known in the outside world. However, in China he is a well-
known public figure. Hu became a member of the CC in 1982 at the
early age of 39. In 1992, only 49 years old, he again attracted attention
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when he was elected to the PBSC. This promotion was apparently sug-
gested by Deng Xiaoping who regarded Hu Jintao as the core of the so-
called fourth generation, i.e., the fourth generation that would eventu-
ally succeed the third generation with Jiang Zemin as its core.
That Hu for ten years has been able to maintain his position as core of
the fourth generation of political leaders in China and the undisputed
heir apparent is testimony to his political skills and acumen. In fact, Hu
possesses the three core competences necessary to make it to the very
top of the political system in China. First he has solid regional work
experience; having worked in Gansu province for many years in the
1970s and early 1980s and by acting as party secretary in the provinces
of Guizhou and Tibet. Second, Hu has worked in the Central Party and
state bureaucracy in Beijing. Third, he holds a university degree which
is a sine qua non for top party and state leaders in China today. In Hu's
case he graduated from the prestigious Tsinghua University. In short,
Hu possesses the experience and competences that are considered im-
portant for leading party cadres in China today.
The Politburo Standing Committee was expected to consist of seven
members, but the CC decided to enlarge the top party organ to nine
members. Apparently, when the decision was made to promote Wu
Guanzheng, it was argued that Huang Ju and Jia Qinglin also had to
follow suit. The three are approximately the same rank and it might
have attracted criticism if only one of them had been promoted and the
other two had been left on a Politburo where their former colleagues
were either promoted or retired because they had reached the age limit.
To prevent such an awkward situation, the decision was made to move
up the 'whole class'.
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Seven members of the new PBSC are engineers by education and
two have university degrees in geology and mining. Four of the engi-
neers are from Tsinghua University. The four Tsinghua graduates are
Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju and Wu Guanzheng. This has rein-
forced Tsinghua's reputation as being one of the major sources for elite
recruitment in China today.
It is noteworthy that four of the new members of the PBSC until re-
cently worked as provincial leaders (See Table 1). Hu Jintao and Wu
Bangguo also share a background as provincial party leaders and Zeng
Qinghong has served as deputy party secretary in Shanghai under Jiang
Zemin. It will be interesting to see whether such strong regional experi-
ences in the top policy-making body will result in attempts to focus
more on the problems in the inner provinces.
It has been argued that five to six of the new members of the PBSC
are members of Jiang's faction. These are: Wu Bangguo, who is ranked
number two and will probably take over Li Peng's post as chairman of
the NPC; Jia Qinglin who is slated for the position of head of the Chi-
nese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); Zeng
Qinghong who is in line to become vice-president when Hu succeeds
Jiang as president next spring; the likely coming executive vice-pre-
mier Huang Ju; Li Changchun who will probably also be appointed
vice-premier and most likely Wu Guanzheng, the new head of the dis-
ciplinary commission. Of the remaining three one is reported to be close
to Zhu Rongji (Wen Jiabao, the likely future premier) and another to Li
Peng (Luo Gan who most probably will be in charge of the legal and
security portfolio). Hu Jintao is considered his own man. However, the
five allegedly pro-Jiang members of the PBSC are perhaps really not
that tight a Jiang clique. They all have their own agendas. Even Zeng
Qinghong, who is considered a close confidant of Jiang, might have a
(reform) agenda going beyond Jiang's ideas.2
Jia Qinglin and Huang Ju probably owe Jiang Zemin the most and
from a factional point of view they may be the easiest to manipulate.
However, Jia is tainted by having served as party secretary in Fujian
province at the time of the big Yuanhua corruption case in Xiamen.
Huang Ju reportedly also has some skeletons in his closet from his ten-
ure as head of the party in Shanghai. Thus both may prove to be liabili-
ties rather than assets for Jiang Zemin.
Luo Gan is reported to be close to Li Peng. However, even though he
is the oldest among the new PBSC members, he ranks last. In fact, dur-
ing last-minute horse-trading he was deprived of the much coveted
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position as head of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee. In-
stead the job went to Wu Guanzheng and Luo Gan ended up with a
reduced legal and security portofolio. This outcome might be seen as a
reflection of Li Peng's weakened position and it will be curious to see
whether Luo Gan will be able to protect his mentor without controlling
the Central Disciplinary Commission.
Wu Bangguo's position as number two indicates that he will be ap-
pointed head of the NPC when Li Peng retires next March. This was
never a given thing as Li Ruihuan was in line for the job. Wu Bangguo's
track record is not the best. As vice-premier he was tasked with reform-
ing the SOEs, but has not managed to complete this important role.
Due to his background as party leader in Shanghai 1991-95, Wu is widely
regarded as a staunch ally of Jiang Zemin's. However, Wu also shares a
background and experiences similar to Hu's, as they were both at
Tsinghua at about the same time in the early 1960s.
Li Changchun is at 58 the youngest of the PBSC members. He is from
the Northeast and was only 38 when he became mayor of Shenyang
city. In 1992 he was appointed party secretary of Henan province. While
he was serving in Henan, the present AIDS epidemic in the province
broke out. However, Li Changchun was transferred to Guangdong in
1998, just in time to avoid being blamed for the problems of the prov-
ince, and has been able to keep his career on track. But echoing the
experiences of Jia Qinglin, his past might well have prevented his rise
to the top had it not been for Jiang Zemin's support.
At one point Wen Jiabao's career also seemed to have peaked. This
was in 1989 when, as head of the party's Central Office, he appeared
together with Zhao Ziyang at Tiananmen Square to tell the students
that it was all too late. However, he was able to dissociate himself from
Zhao Ziyang so that the downfall of the former general secretary had
no major repercussions for Wen Jiabao. Thus he was appointed vice-
premier in 1998 and, under Zhu Rongji's direction, was assigned to ru-
ral work and attempts to reform the ailing bank sector.
It is rather surprising that Li Ruihuan did not manage to retain his
Politburo seat. Li is only 67 years old (the age of Luo Gan) and has not
yet reached the 70-year age limit which operates informally in China.
However, Jiang wanted him to retire, fearing that he might use his sta-
tus as the elder statesman in the new Politburo to advance his slightly
veiled criticism of Jiang and the 'Three Representations'. Apparently
Jiang used the argument that Li Ruihuan belonged to the outgoing third
generation which has to give way to younger forces.
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Composition of the new Politburo
The Politburo, the second-highest seat of power, consists of the nine PBSC
members plus 15 full PB  members and one alternate (see Table 2 )
The Politburo has been completely reshuffled and the members who
were not retired have been promoted. As indicated above, this is prob-
ably the main reason for enlarging the PBSC to nine members. All those
who had not yet reached retirement age were simply moved up.
A third of the below-listed 24 members of the Politburo are regional
party leaders. In the outgoing Politburo only four of the 20 full mem-
bers were provincial leaders. They all came from eastern coastal prov-
inces such as Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong and Shandong. Now Shang-
hai, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Hubei and Xinjiang are
represented with their party leaders. In addition He Guoqiang only re-
cently was transferred from his position as party secretary in Chongqing
to take up his present assignment as head of the Central Organization
Department. The appointment of the Xinjiang and Hubei party secre-
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taries as Politburo members is particularly noteworthy. These relatively
poor inland provinces are normally not represented in the Politburo. In
fact, this is the first time in the history of the PRC that Xinjiang has a full
member of the Politburo.3
It has been reported that Zhang Dejiang has been moved to
Guangdong, replacing Li Changchun. To replace Zhang Dejiang Xi
Jinping has been appointed Zhejiang party secretary. Moreover, Zhang
Gaoli has been moved to Shandong, Bai Keming to Hebei, and Wang
Qishan to Hainan. These personnel changes mean that Guangdong has
retained its Politburo status, whereas Shandong is no longer represented.
Barring any major reshuffle, this picture represents a clear victory for
the localities, especially the inner provinces.
Wang Lequan's promotion to the Politburo is a reflection of several
important developments. First, Xinjiang has experienced a compara-
tively rapid economic development in recent years and is now one of
the more wealthy of the inland provinces. Second, Xinjiang's increas-
ingly strategic importance in the global war against anti-terrorism prob-
ably is an important factor. Thus it has been reported that Wang Lequan
might be given more responsibilities in fighting terrorism. Third, Wang
Lequan's presence on the Politburo might indicate that the new leader-
ship is willing to pay closer attention to the problems in the poorer
innner provinces. Hu Jintao made his career in the inner provinces, in
particular Gansu, and might be more inclined than Jiang and his Shang-
hai group to push for a redistribution of funds and investment to the
benefit of these regions. In this he will have the support of Wen Jiabao,
who also worked in Gansu in the 1970s and early 1980s.
None of the so-called fifth-generation leaders, such as Zhao Leji (45,
governor, Qinghai), Li Keqiang (47, party secretary, Henan), Xi Jinping
(49, governor Fujian, now Zhejiang party secretary) and Bo Xilai (53,
governor, Liaoning) made it to the Politburo. Apparently Jiang Zemin
blocked such appointments, arguing it was too soon for these young
regional leaders to move up the hierarchy. Also either they all had to be
appointed or the top leadership would have had to make a decision on
whom to consider the core of this new political generation and on this
they could not agree.
It should also be noted that the new Politburo is weak on security
and foreign policy expertise. Apparently, Wu Yi will be given the for-
eign policy portofolio. However, although she has extensive experiences
on trade-related issues from her time as minister of foreign trade and
external relations, she is not known as a foreign policy expert on a par
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with outgoing Vice-Premier Qian Qichen or Foreign Minister Tang
Jiaxun. Given such a situation, Jiang Zemin and other elders will con-
tinue to have a role to play in foreign policy-making. Whether this will
entail that Jiang will continue to chair some of the important leading
small groups such as the national security leading group and the Tai-
wan leading small group remains to be seen.
Central Military Commission
The Central Military Commission (CMC) elected by the Central Com-
mittee consists of eight members. Jiang was re-elected chairman and
Hu Jintao vice-chairman. There are two new vice-chairmen: Guo
Boxiong, former executive deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA,
and Cao Gangchuan, former director of the General Armaments De-
partment. They are both members of the new Politburo. The other new
CMC members are generals Xu Caihou, director of the General Politi-
cal Department, Liao Xilong, director of the General Logistics Depart-
ment, and Li Jinai, director of the General Armaments Department and
finally the new chief of general staff, Liang Guanglie. Liang has served
as commander of the Nanjing Military Region (2002-02).
This setup seems to indicate that Jiang will step down in March 2003.
It makes little sense to have eight members of the CMC, as Chinese top
organs usually comprise an uneven number. Barring a major interna-
tional crisis or increased tension in the Taiwan Straits, it is most likely
that Jiang will step down in March when the NPC meets. Then there
will be the possibility of electing a new chairman of the state CMC. It
does not make sense to change the party CMC now and then wait until
March to change the state CMC, as this would result in a situation where
there were two different chairmen.
If Jiang does not step down but instead, as is rumoured in the West-
ern media, stays on for another couple of years, then he will not have
fully retired (quantui), but will continue to pull the strings in an arrange-
ment similar to the one that Deng instituted in 1987.
Central Committee (CC)
The 16th Party Congress elected a new Central Committee consisting
of 198 members and 158 alternate members.
There are 112 new members of the full CC (56 percent of total mem-
bership). The average age of the new CC is 55 years of age, 0.5 years
lower than the 15th CC. Those below 50 years of age account for more
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than one-fifth of the membership. Predictably, everyone born before
1937 has now retired with the exception of Luo Gan, Ismail Amat, Gao
Gangchuan, Li Guixian and Xu Kuangdi. As a new member of the PBSC,
Luo Gan had to stay and Gao Gangchuan's position on the CC Military
Commission also necessitates a PB seating. Why Li and Xu, the former
mayor of Shanghai, were reappointed is unclear. A number of fifth-gen-
eration representatives such as Bo Xilai (53), Xi Jinping (49), Li Keqiang
(47) and Zhao Leji (45) were also elected, whereas former CCP party
chairman Hua Guofeng finally had to relinquish his seat.
The number of female members has dropped from 7 to 4 (2 percent).
National minority members number 15 (7.5 percent), which is about
the same percentage as in the outgoing CC. It is noteworthy that about
98 percent of the members have an educational background equivalent
to a college degree (daxue benke), 6.2 percent higher than the 15th CC
and 15.2 percent higher than the 14th CC. In fact, this is the best-edu-
cated CC ever in the history of the PRC. Thus the policy to appoint
leaders and cadres on the basis of educational background and profes-
sional criteria is now being applied at CC elections.
It is also noteworthy that there are representatives from the business
world among the new CC alternate members. They include Xie Qihua,
president of the Baoshan Iron and Steel Company; Xi Guohua, presi-
dent of the China Network Communication Corporation; and Zhang
Ruimin, the chief CEO of the Haier Group. However, these are all busi-
ness leaders in the state-dominated sector. Thus rumours that private
entrepreneurs might be elected to CC did not come true. Apparently,
there was widespread resistance against incorporating private entre-
preneurs at this point in time, even though the Party Congress decided
to write the 'Three Representations' into the party programme.
Two Aproaches to Chinese Politics
There are two main positions in evaluating the 16th Congress and its
results. The first position sees the outcome as the result of factional poli-
tics.4  This approach posits that outgoing leaders such as Jiang Zemin,
Li Peng and Zhu Rongji have formed networks based on political loy-
alty. These are personalized networks that serve the interests of the per-
son (patron) heading the network. The network leader looks after the
interest of his followers (clients). Jiang Zemin's faction is based in Shang-
hai and is the strongest. It musters five to six of the nine members of the
new PBSC, many regional leaders and leading military figures. Li Peng's
network encompasses the ministry of electricity and parts of the NPC
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xitong. Zhu Rongji's faction reputedly consists of leading personnel in
the State Economic and Trade Commision and other central organs en-
gaged in economic planning and policy-making. Hu Jintao's network is
rooted in the Communist Youth League which Hu headed during the
late 1980s. Recently Hu has also developed strong connections in the
Central Party School.
Based on such a factional analysis, Jiang Zemin continues to domi-
nate the PBSC even though he has officially stepped down. As faction
head, he will command the loyalty of the people he has promoted. Their
presence will help to contain whatever political ambitions Hu Jintao
might have.
The second view claims that the Politburo is dominated by consen-
sual decision-making among leading individuals.5  The policy process
is strongly influenced by the senior members; however, propositions to
win assent have to be presented in a reasonable light rather than as a
reflection of a single person's fiat or instance of power play. In short,
there has been a process of procedural normativization and routinization
which will prevent Jiang's patrimonial aspirations from prevailing. This
is in fact a return to the round-table model of political decision-making
which characterized China before the Great Leap Forward.6
Since the mid-1990s new detailed regulations for the selection and
appointment of leading cadres have been put in place. In February 1995
the Interim Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Gov-
ernment Leading Cadres were issued.7  They specified clear regulations
for the recruitment, appointment and management of leading cadres
from the county level and above. Another important document is the
Development Programme Concerning the Establishment of a National Party
and State Leadership for 1998-2003, which was issued in June 1998.8  In
June 2000 the Programme to Deepen the Cadre Personnel System was pub-
lished. 9  Finally, in July 2002, new Regulations on the Selection and Ap-
pointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres were published. They
replace the above-mentioned Interim Regulations of 1995.10
These documents stipulate clear criteria for the selection and appoint-
ment of leading cadres and the mechanisms for promotion within the
system. Thus there are clear criteria concerning age, gender and na-
tional minority distribution. Educational qualifications are also stressed.
Thus an educational background equivalent to a college degree (daxue
benke) is now required for leading cadres. New statistics show that al-
ready 88 percent of all leading cadres from the important departmental
(ju) level and above can now boast of these qualifications.
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The new regulations from July 2002 emphasize that cadres should
rise gradually in the system. Thus for promotion to a leading post higher
than county level, work experience of holding more than two posts at
lower-level organs is generally required. Moreover, candidates promoted
to a head post (zheng zhi) from a deputy post are generally required to
have worked at the deputy post for more than two years. Clearly, the
party wishes to avoid the kind of helicoptering which some cadres ex-
perienced during the Cultural Revolution. The new regulations also
elaborate on ways to ‘democratically recommend’ and evaluate lead-
ing cadres; on the principles for ‘deliberating’ candidates; and for mak-
ing decisions through discussions. There is no doubt that the authori-
ties wish to portray an image of a recruitment and appointment proc-
ess characterized by clear rules and regulations.
The Development Programme from 1998 stipulates that by the year 2003
every administrative level from the centre down to county and town
(zhen) levels should have a leadership line-up consisting of different
age groups, ranging from leaders in their sixties to young cadres in
their forties. This is to ensure a flexible cadre corps with a so-called
rational age composition in the leadership bodies (lingdao banzi). The
Development Programme also mentions the establishment of a group of
reserve cadres (houbei ganbu), who should be groomed to take over lead-
ership positions.
Recently, age requirements have become the focus of attention. These
are associated with the so-called '680 Project' which aims to promote
those cadres born in the 1960s who graduated and started working in
the 1980s, i.e., young officials below the age of 40. The ‘680 Project’ was
launched at the beginning of 2000 which saw several high-level meet-
ings to discuss the issue of selecting and promoting young cadres. In
what seems to be a follow-up on the‘680 Project’, the Organizational
Department has recently required that cadres at the level of section head,
division head, and bureau head step down from their leading post at
the ages of 52, 55 and 58 respectively.11  Whether these new age require-
ments will be fully introduced remains to be seen. But there is no doubt
that there is strong emphasis on this issue in the party apparatus.
It would have been a major setback to the whole process of institu-
tional normativization unfolding since the mid-1990s if Jiang Zemin
and his third-generation colleagues had not stepped down from the
Standing Committee. In 1997 at the 15th Party Congress, Jiang Zemin
had himself been arguing for a 70-year age-limit for re-election to the
Standing Committee, reportedly in an attempt to retire his rival Qiao
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Shi. Had he himself violated this norm, it would have created consider-
able resentment, not only from the new fourth-generation leaders wait-
ing for their turn, but also on the part of retired party elders such as
Qiao Shi, Wan Li, Liu Huaqing, Song Renqiong, etc.
Conclusion
China has recently initiated a major leadership transition – in fact the
most comprehensive in the history of the PRC. Thus far it has resulted
in the election of a completely new party leadership. Only one out of
the nine members of the new PBSC was on the former PBSC and almost
two-thirds of the regular members of the Politburo are new. In the spring
of 2003 a similar renewal of leadership will take place in top state or-
gans. Thus Jiang Zemin is scheduled to be succeeded as president by
Hu Jintao; Zhu Rongji will most likely pass on his mantle as premier to
Wen Jiabao; and Li Peng will make way for Wu Bangguo as chairman
of the NPC. The composition of the new leadership is the outcome of
an intense power struggle. However, the succession process has for the
first time taken place in a peaceful and deliberate manner, in conform-
ity with norms and rules concerning age, educational background, and
professional capabilities that have been introduced for lower levels in
recent years. In short, a process of institutionalization and normati-
vization has taken place, which bodes well for China's continued po-
litical stability.
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